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Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of the market for stolen goods on crime, using county-
level data for the United States between 1997 and 2010. We analyze this issue through the
lens of pawnshops, a widespread business that offers secured loans to people, with items of
personal property used as collateral. The endogeneity of pawnshops to crime is addressed ex-
ploiting the exogenous shift in the gold price - the main determinant of pawnbrokers’ profit
function - as a quasi natural experiment, where the intensity of the treatment is given by the
initial concentration of pawnshops in the county. A one standard deviation increase in pawn-
shops’ concentration raises by 0.05 standard deviation the effect of gold price on burglaries and
robberies. No effect is detected on all other crimes.
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“If he’s coming in my store with a VCR, I’m not asking him where he got it. It’s the police’s job
to find out if it’s stolen, not mine. You don’t ask where things come from. If you don’t take those,
the guy down the street will” (Glover and Larubbia, 1996)
1 Introduction
Theft crimes produce a substantial harm to society. In 2010, there have been an estimated 9.5
million theft crimes in the US territory that caused an economic loss for the victims of almost $16
billions (FBI, 2010).1 On this note, research from criminologists suggests that the availability of
stolen goods markets might play a key role in burglar’s choice of whether, or where, committing
a theft (Sutton, 2010). Nevertheless, despite the critical importance of understanding the link
between demand and supply of crime, a systematic empirical investigation is missing. Two main
obstacles hinder this type of analysis. First, markets for stolen properties are hardly identifiable.
Secondly, these are not randomly assigned to geographic locations.
This paper heavily contributes to the existing literature on the determinants of crime by in-
vestigating the effect of stolen goods markets on crime.2 Specifically, we look at this mechanism
through the lens of pawnshops, a widespread business that offers secured loans to people, with items
of personal property used as collateral. Thus, can pawnshops’ potential demand of stolen items
cause an increase in the supply of theft crimes?
Pawnshops are second hand businesses where clients bring their personal items to be either
1Personal calculation from the author, obtained summing up data on larceny, robbery, burglary and motor and
vehicle theft from the FBI reports for the year 2010.
2Different studies have analyzed a wide set of crime’s potential determinants. Among these we find: the effect
of police and incarceration (Levitt 1997, Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2004, Klick and Tabarrok 2005, Levitt 1996,
Levitt 1998, Helland and Tabarrok 2007, Drago, Galbiati and Vertova 2009, Lee and McCrary 2009, Draca, Machin
and Witt 2011), conditions in prisons (Katz, Levitt and Shustorovich 2003), parole and bail institutions (Kuziemko
2007), education (Western, Kling and Weiman 2001, Lochner and Moretti 2004), social interactions and peer effects
(Case and Katz 1991, Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman 1996, Gaviria and Raphael 2001, Kling, Ludwig and Katz
2005, Jacob and Lefgren 2003, Bayer, Hjalmarsson and Pozen 2009), family circumstances (Glaeser and Sacerdote
1999, Donohue and Levitt 2001). Economists have also focused on the the effect of criminal histories on labor market
outcomes (Grogger 1995, Kling 2006), the impact of unemployment and wages on crime (Grogger 1998, Raphael
andWinter- Ebmer 2001), the strategic interplay between violent and property crime (Silverman 2004), the optimal
law enforcement (Polinsky and Shavell 2000, Eeckhout, Persico and Todd 2009) the immigration status (Bianchi,
Buonanno and Pinotti 2012) and the impact of violent movies and pornography on violent crimes (Dahl and Della
Vigna 2009 and Bhuller, Havnes, Leuven and Mogstad 2011).
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sold for cash, or to be used as a collateral, for high - interest loans. This type of business have
long been suspected of illicit trade. While the proponents of these shops, led by the National
Pawnbrokers Association, stigmatize the frequency of this phenomenon, public opinion, newspapers
and criminologists point the finger against this “modern thief’s automatic cash machine” (Glover
and Larubbia, 1996). Despite the different standpoint, given that pawnbrokers assume the risk that
an item might have been stolen, laws in many jurisdictions protect the brokers from unknowingly
handling stolen goods. These laws usually require, for each transaction, a photo identification of
the client (such as a driver’s license or government-issued identity document), as well as a “holding”
period on the item purchased by the pawnbroker, to allow local law enforcement authorities to track
stolen items. For the same reason, in some jurisdictions, pawnshops must regularly communicate
to police a list of all newly pawned items and, if possible, any associated serial number.
Regardless of the existence of an accurate legislation, different dynamics can turn a pawnshop
into a market for stolen goods (Sutton, 2010). First of all thieves, exploiting the increase in personal
properties’ trade in the community, can circumvent the security measures of an honest pawnbroker,
“disguising” the stolen property in the regular flow of allowed items. Then, in some cases, the
competition for profits could undermine the security policy of a pawnbroker, leading him to accept
- from time to time - items of uncertain origin. From the words of a pawnbroker: “If he’s coming
in my store with a VCR, I’m not asking him where he got it. It’s the police’s job to find out if it’s
stolen, not mine. You don’t ask where things come from. If you don’t take those, the guy down
the street will”, (Glover and Larubbia, 1996). Finally, in a worst scenario, the pawnbroker could
explicitly facilitate the sale of stolen goods in his shop (fencing), exploiting the lack of a strict law
enforcement from local authorities or - for example - the fact that the majority of stolen goods lack
of a unique identifier and are hardly recognizable by police or by the victims.3
While the exact understanding of these dynamics goes beyond the scope of this paper, obtaining
3Pawnbrokers have often been associated with fencing. While pawnbrokers do not like this characterization of
their business, police efforts have indicated that some pawnbrokers are actually involved in fencing. For example, in
the US, the Sarasota Police Department, Venice Police Department and North Port Police Department assisted with
the undercover operation to sell gold jewelry to each business. Many were found to be in compliance. However, a
number of businesses were operating under a ’no questions asked’ policy, making no attempt to properly document
the seller information, record the items being purchased or obtain the seller’s fingerprint, all of which are state
requirements" (Bill, 2011)
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evidence on the causal effect of the availability of stolen goods markets on the supply of crime is
complicated by a number of reasons. Pawnshops mainly serve the credit needs of low income people.
Hence, the endogenous sorting of pawnshops in communities with a large presence of potential
customers biases upward ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, given that these communities
usually experience an higher level of crime. Further biases are caused by omitted variables that
correlates with both the presence of pawnshops and crime, or by the possibility that the endogenous
sorting of pawnshops is a direct response of the expected level of crime in the community (reverse
causality bias).
We address these issues in several ways. In the first part of the paper, the empirical strategy
uniquely relies on the properties of the panel dataset constructed for the analysis: 2176 counties
in 50 states, almost 70% of the US total, from 1997 to 2010. The variables of interest are 1)
the number of crimes reported and 2) the number of pawnshops, both by county per year. The
structure of the panel allows for the inclusion of county fixed effect, that control for unobserved time
invariant heterogeneity across counties. The baseline empirical analysis focuses on the effect of the
within county variation in the number of pawnshops on the number of reported theft crimes, both
expressed in per capita terms. Year fixed effects and states linear trends are included to control
for nationwide and state specific confounding shocks. Moreover, the analysis includes a rich set of
county socio - economic controls. The clear attempt is to shut down possible endogeneity concerns
due to the omission of county specific time varying unobservables, possibly related to the within
county changes in the number of pawnshops and crime.
Ordinary least squares estimates show a strong effect of the number of pawnshops per capita
only on two types of theft crimes: larceny and burglary, with an elasticity respectively of 1.4 and
0.9, both significant at the 1% level. These findings are robust to extensive robustness checks, the
clustering of standard errors at different levels, the sensitivity to outliers, weighting the regression by
a measure of the quality of the information available to the researcher and using different functional
forms. Moreover, implicit falsification tests on other crimes - that should not be directly affected
by the presence of these businesses - disprove the possibility that pawnshops might influence crime
through different channels other than the potential demand for stolen goods. In particular, the
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availability of data on motor - vehicle thefts gives the possibility of unambiguously testing the
hypothesis of the paper. Very reassuringly, this particular theft crime is totally insensitive to the
presence of pawnshops in the county. We have all the reasons to believe that this happens because
motor and vehicles are never accepted in pawnshops’ transactions. Results are further validated by
the fact that no effect is detected on any other crime.
The effect of on crime is more acute in densely populated counties, where - plausibly - the
anonymity of the environment amplifies the likelihood of the pawnshop being a convenient desti-
nation for stolen items. In less densely populated areas instead, pawnshops might be far from the
crime scene, crime is generally less frequent and residents are more willing to defend the interests
of the members of their communities. This could discourage thieves to use this channel to get rid
of stolen items.
Moreover, we extend tha analysis in the attempt to detect geographical spillover effects on crime.
We do so by constructing two different measures related to the concentration of pawnshops 1) in
bordering counties 2) and at the state level. Interestingly, results show that within county changes
in larcenies and burglaries are significantly affected from the variation of both the concentration of
pawnshops in the same county and in the state. Conversely, we detect a negative - but insignificant
- effect for pawnshops in bordering counties. On the one hand, these results confirm the findings
obtained from several burglars’ interviews (Sutton, 2010). In fact, knowing that the probability
of arrest increases while stolen property is in possession, burglars prefer to commit thefts at a
maximum distance of half an hour by car from the predetermined resale point (Sutton, 2010). On
the other hand, we detect strong geographical spillover effects that show how burglars might take
the risk of traveling far from the crime scene, plausibly to avoid suspects about the origin of the
item or to outdistance the good from the place where it was stolen. Overall, these results seem to
capture a non monotonic relationship between the distance of the theft crime’s location and the
planned resale point. These findings suggests interesting directions for future research.
Despite the use of panel data techniques, it is important to notice that the lack of random
assignment of pawnshops to counties poses two different threats to the identification of a causal
parameter. First of all, results might driven by the omission of time variant unobservables both
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related to within county changes in the number of pawnshops and theft crimes. But, what magnitude
should have the bias to completely invalidate our findings? The Altonji et al. (2005) method of
assessing selection on unobservables using selection on observables is pursued in this context. The
rule of thumb outlined in Nunn and Wantchekon (2012) is that any ratio above 1 is acceptable. In
our case the Altonjii ratio is above 10 for theft crimes, finally suggesting that there is little concern
that selection on unobservables is the main driver of our results. A second econometric concern is
related to the bias arising from the reverse causality between pawnshops and larcenies/burglaries.
We solve this issue in the last section of the paper, where we address the endogeneity of pawnshops
exploiting the exogenous rise in the price of gold as a quasi natural experiment.
The choice of including the price of gold in the analysis depends on a different set of reasons.
Gold has always been the major determinant of pawnbrokers’ profit function, roughly representing
80 percent of the value of all pledges (Bos et al, 2012). Hence, given the inherent high profitability,
pawnbrokers are characterized by an high demand for gold that materializes through the request of
jewelry. But, what makes jewelry and - in particular - gold so profitable for pawnbrokers’ activities?
Along side the fact that gold is one of the most precious metal, a big part of the pawnbrokers’ profits
comes from the process of melting down the gold received by their clients through the “refinement”
process. In fact, 90% of the times pawnbrokers sell their jewelry to a company that is known
as a ‘refiner.’ A refiner will take all of the rings, necklaces, bracelets and other items and melt
them. Truly professional outfits will then begin to remove impurities from the metals until they get
something close to pure gold. Hence, stolen items, easily transformed into an unrecognizable bar
of precious metal, can disappear forever from the second - hand market (Sutton, 2010). Clearly,
this dynamic might facilitate burglars’ (or pawnbrokers’) attempt of safely getting rid of the stolen
goods.
This persistent demand for jewelry and gold in particular might influence criminal behavior. In
fact, as in any other type of economic activity, the exact knowledge of the demand for stolen goods
might affect the type of items that are actually stolen. The underlying hypothesis of the paper is
that the shift in the resale value of gold, exogenously determined by changes in the macroeconomic
conditions, while potentially increasing burglars’ expected value of committing a theft uniformly in
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all counties, might cause relatively more theft crimes in counties with an higher concentration of
markets interested in acquiring stolen jewelry. We test this hypothesis exploiting the exogenous
rise in the price of gold as a quasi natural experiment, where the intensity of the treatment is
measured by the initial concentration of pawnshops to the county. Specifically, the identification
strategy relies on the exogeneity of the interaction between the gold price and the concentration of
pawnshops in the county, fixed at the first year of the sample. Clearly, this research design shuts
down the endogeneity concerns related to the bias arising from the presence of reverse causality.
Again, results support our hypothesis. A one standard deviation increase in the initial concen-
tration of pawnshops in the county increases by 0.05 standard deviation the effect of the rise of gold
price on burglaries and robberies, the two theft crimes whose likely outcome is jewelry. Conversely,
the effect on larceny, that usually includes thefts of bicycles, motor vehicle parts and accessories,
shoplifting, pocket-picking, or the stealing of any property or article that is not taken by force,
is noisy and not precisely estimated. To further validate our hypothesis, no effect is detected on
motor and vehicle thefts and on all other crimes.
We are aware that one of the main limitation of this study is the absence of a robust welfare
analysis related to the possible opening or closing of a pawnshop in a particular county, mainly
due to data unavailability on the financial service provided by these businesses. Nevertheless, one
of the fundamental merit of this paper is to uncover a precise and previously undetected causal
mechanism, showing that the presence of a potential market for stolen goods can indeed cause
theft crimes. We believe that this has already the power to inform policy. A closer monitoring of
pawnshops from local authorities, (as well as of other potential markets for crime not considered
in this paper), in fact seems to be warranted. This improved monitoring could plausibly reduce
the illegal demand for stolen goods and, consequently, the number of theft crimes in pawnshops’
surrounding area.
Structure of the paper
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents some suggestive evidence related to the
link between pawnshops and theft crimes. Section 3 presents the data and lays down the initial
econometric framework, reporting the different results, various robustness checks and heterogeneity
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in the results. Section 4 introduces the role of gold in the quasi natural experiment, outlines the
research design and presents the results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Pawnshops As a Market Place for Stolen Goods: Suggestive
Evidence
Pawnshops, payday loans and check cashing outlets are all businesses that provide instant credit to
“unbanked” clients at a very high interest rates.4 Nevertheless, within all these activities, pawnbro-
kers offer a unique service: the supply of instant cash to their clients, only through the exchange
of personal property’s items. The standard procedure begins with the assessment of the monetary
value of the item brought by the client. If the client agrees with the offer made by the pawnbroker,
she can either directly sell the item to the pawnbroker or she can ask for a loan, using the pledge
as a collateral. Usually, the offer made by the pawnbroker ranges from 30 to 75 per cent of the
market value of the pledge, with the average loan value being 100$ for a two months period. The
pawnbroker holds the personal item in custody until the maturity date of the loan. Importantly,
in case the client does not return to claim back the pledged item at the maturity date, this be-
comes pawnbroker’s property.5 The majority of pawnshops transactions involve jewelry such as
rings, bracelets and necklaces but also electronics items such as televisions, stereo, mp3 and camera
equipment (Bos et al., 2012).
In principle, the pawnbroker assumes the risk that an item might have been stolen. Nevertheless,
to be found guilty of criminal possession, the pawnbroker must know that the item he is accepting is
4U.S. households purchased more than $40 billion in high-cost short-term loans using the “fringe banking sector”
in 2007, Fellowes and Mabanta (2008). Even if there is no official and reliable estimate of the total number of clients,
industry reports suggest that 34 million adults demanded the services of these companies. The sector consists of
several types of high-cost lenders, but two comprise the dominant portion: payday lenders and pawnshops. In 2007
pawnshops made 42 million transactions for an overall value of 2.5 billion dollars. The maximum interest rate set
by pawnbrokers and payday lenders is generally regulated at the state level. For a complete review of pawnshops’
operating system see Shackman and Tenney (2006).
5Alternatively, the pawnbroker becomes the owner of the item as soon as the sale process ends. Around 80 percent
of pawn loans tend to be repaid and repeat customers account for much of the loan volume. Moreover, it is common
for a customer to use the same pledge as collateral to obtain sequential loans (Avery, 2011).
8
actually stolen, a fact often difficult to prove. Consequently, the main risk that the pawnbroker faces
is the loss of both the collateral and the amount loaned if the police seize the item. On this note,
the National Pawnbrokers Association (NPA) states that the best way to avoid the unknowingly
handling of stolen goods, and all its related issues, is “...(by) refusing any items that are suspicious in
nature or thought to be misappropriated”. Nevertheless, always according to the NPA: “... less than
half of one per cent of all pawned merchandise is identified as stolen. That’s because customers must
provide positive identification and a complete description of the merchandise. This information is
then regularly transmitted to law enforcement, which dramatically decreases the likelihood that a thief
would bring stolen merchandise to a pawn store”. The NPA claim is supported by some industry
study. In an inspection of 65,000 pawn transactions made in Dallas County, only 0.4 per cent of
the items were identified as stolen (Scott 1992). Similar results are reported for Oklahoma (Wheat
1998) and in Florida for Collier and Palm Beach counties (Florida Committee on Criminal Justice
2000).
Conversely, other investigative reports - narrowly focusing on the criminal histories of the most
frequent pawners - support the hypothesis that pawnshops deal with stolen property items. The first
analysis of this type was conducted by Glover and Larrubia (1996). The reporters, after gathering
all 70,000 pawn slips in Ft. Lauderdale, ranked pawnshops clients by the number of transactions
made in that year. Thirty-nine of these top 50 pawners had criminal arrest records, nineteen of
which were for burglary, theft, or related offenses.6 Fass and Francis (2005) used a similar approach
to analyze a database of all pawn transactions recorded by the Dallas Police Department (DPD)
during the six-year period from January 1, 1991, through December 31, 1996.7 The evidence from
this analysis is startling. The 14,500 people pawning 30 times or more during the period were
responsible of the 24 per cent of total loan value. These frequent pawners “... were two to three
times more likely to have been convicted for theft, larceny, burglary, or robbery than those who
6In a subsequent study Wallace (1997) describes how pawnshops may enable a few highly motivated criminals
to commit many offenses. For example, an unemployed man visited a single pawnshop 38 times in less than two
months and pawned, among other items, thirteen women’s rings, ten men’s rings, eleven necklaces, nine cameras,
six watches, three VCRs, and two televisions. The day after his last visit to the pawnshop, the man was arrested
for burglary. Another police survey of frequent pawners produced like findings in Portland, Oregon. 90 per cent of
these pawners were chronic drug users with long criminal records (Hammond 1997).
7Each transaction shows a pawn ticket number, a pawner identification number, shop identification number,
transaction date, and classification code for items pawned.
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pawned once or twice”. Moreover “... nearly 65% of the 1,100 individuals within the group who
pawned more than one hundred times had arrest records, more than half of them for some kind of
stealing”.8
Wright and Decker (1994) interviewing burglars in the St. Louis area, describe different mech-
anisms through which pawnshops may be used to quickly convert stolen goods into cash. First,
even if the burglar must provide his name, address, and a form of identification, rarely jurisdictions
make full use of this information. Moreover, these requirements can be easily deceived. The burglar
may provide false information (Glover and Larrubia, 1996) or use false identification when needed.
Alternatively, some burglars reported persuading friends to pawn the items for them, reducing the
likelihood that the pawnbroker would not accept the item from a suspicious client (Wright and
Decker, 1994). Finally, two important aspects seem to support the hypothesis that pawnshops
might be used by burglars as a channel for getting rid of the stolen property. First of all, given
that the majority of stolen goods lack of a unique identifier, their recognition might be extremely
difficult for the pawnbroker, the police and even for the victim itself. Secondly, jewelry such as
rings, bracelets and necklaces can be easily melted down, transforming forever stolen items into an
unrecognizable bar of precious metal (Sutton, 2010). We will further discuss this second point in
the last section of the paper.
8Within the sample of the top 100 pawners, 83 individuals had arrest records. “Of these, 58 had accumulated
300 convictions for property as well as other offenses, or an average of 5.2 arrests per individual. Most property
crime arrests, 74 per cent, were for theft, 11 per cent for burglary of vehicles, 7 per cent for burglary of homes or
businesses, 5 per cent for robbery, and the rest for forgery and car theft. Other infractions mainly involved drug
possession (23 per cent) or driving without a license (23 per cent)”. A similar analysis, conducted by Comeau and
Klofas (2012) for the city of Rochester, NY shows equivalent evidence.
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3 Data and Empirical Analysis
Data
This paper focuses on a balanced panel of 2176 US Counties, (70% of all the counties in the United
States), in 50 States from 1997 to 2010. The final dataset is obtained by merging information from
several sources. Data on criminal offenses is taken from the National Archive of Criminal Justice
Data.9 Eight different type of crimes are reported: larceny, burglary, robbery, motor-vehicle theft,
murder, aggravated assault, rape, arson.10 Our analysis needs a clear distinction between the first
three different crimes. The FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program defines larceny as the
unlawful taking, carrying, leading, or riding away of property from the possession or constructive
possession of another.11 Burglary instead is defined as the unlawful entry of a structure to commit
a felony or theft. Finally, robbery is the taking or attempting to take anything of value from the
care, custody, or control of a person or persons by force or threat of force or violence and/or by
putting the victim in fear.12 Data on our variable of interest - the total number of pawnshops by
county per year - is obtained by Infogroup Academic, a US private company.13 Figure 1 shows the
geographic distribution of the number of pawnshops in 1997, the first year in our analysis.14
Figure 3.1:
9Data is freely downloadable at : http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/con-
tent/NACJD/guides/ucr.html#desc_cl.
10County-level files are created by NACJD based on agency records in a file obtained from the FBI that also
provides aggregated county totals. NACJD imputes missing data and then aggregates the data to the county-level.
The FBI definition of the eight types of crime can be found in the data appendix.
11Examples are thefts of bicycles, motor vehicle parts and accessories, shoplifting, pocket-picking, or the stealing
of any property or article that is not taken by force and violence or by fraud. Attempted larcenies are included.
Embezzlement, confidence games, forgery, check fraud, etc., are excluded
12More information are available at the following web page: http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/handbook/ucrhand-
book04.pdf.
13More informations available at http://lp.infogroup.com/academic. Infogroup provided me with the overall num-
ber of pawnshops by county, per year. The data gathering process follows a six step procedure. In the compilation
phase, data is taken directly from different sources such as: Government, public company filings, Utility Information,
NCOA, Tourism Directories, web compilation and RSS Feeds etc... The second step in the process is the address
standardization process followed by a phone verification phase with 40 millions call made per year. The last three
phases include a standardization of elements and a duplicate removal, an enhanced content and a final quality check.
14In our sample of 70% of all the counties in the United States we have an average of 9800 pawnshops per year.
These numbers are confirmed by other studies. See - for example - Fellowees and Mabanta (2008), Shackman and
Tenney (2006).
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Table 1 panel A shows an almost perfect balance of the panel for the 14 years considered in the
analysis. This balance allows for an estimation free from compositional concerns. Panel B reports
crime - related summary statistics, expressed by county and normalized per 100,000 people. The
average number of pawnshops by county is 5.87, with a standard deviation of 6.32.15 Larceny is
the most common theft crime, followed by burglary and motor - vehicle theft.16 Robbery, probably
due to its violent nature, it is the less frequent theft crime. On average, all violent crimes and arson
happen less frequently, with the lowest reported crime being murder, with an average of 3.62 and
a standard deviation of 5.33.
Table 1:
Table 1 panel C shows the summary statistics for the wide set of county socioeconomic controls.17
From the US Census Bureau we have gathered data on income, poverty, population, ethnic and
racial composition of the county, density, number of commercial banks and savings institutions
and amount of deposits. Data on labour condition (unemployment, number of social insurance
recipients and social security average monthly payment) is obtained from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics-Current Population Survey. Data on the number of sworn police officers and civilian
employees comes from the Department of Justice-Federal Bureau of Investigation.18
15In our empirical framework we exploit the within county variation in the number of pawnshops per capita, that
is 3.11 representing 54% of the sample mean.
16In the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, property crime includes the offenses of burglary, larceny-
theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. The object of the theft-type offenses is the taking of money or property, but
there is no force or threat of force against the victims. The property crime category includes arson because the
offense involves the destruction of property; however, arson victims may be subjected to force. Because of limited
participation and varying collection procedures by local law enforcement agencies, only limited data are available for
arson. in the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, violent crime is composed of four offenses: murder
and non negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Violent crimes are defined in the
UCR Program as those offenses which involve force or threat of force.
17The majority of information is gathered through the following web site: http://censtats.cen-
sus.gov/usa/usa.shtml.
18Sworn police officers are law enforcement employees with arrest powers. Civilian employees include personnel
employed by each local agency who do not have arrest powers and include job classifications such as clerks, radio
dispatchers, meter maids, stenographers and accountants.
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Empirical Analysis
We start by estimating the following OLS equation:
yi,s,t = αi + γt + µs,t +X
′
i,s,tβ0 +#pawni,s,tβ1 + i,s,t
where i indicates the county, s the state and t the year. The outcome of interest is the number of
reported crimes, by county per year. The coefficient of interest is β1, the effect of pawnshops on
crime. Both the number of crimes and the number of pawnshops are expressed in per capita terms.
Standard errors are clustered at the county level, to allow for serial correlation of the error term
within county.
The identification strategy heavily relies on the properties of the panel dataset. First, we exploit
within county variation by including county fixed effects αi. In this way we control for the presence
of time invariant unobserved characteristics that can be related to the evolution of pawnshops
and crime. Then, we condition on year fixed effects γt and state linear trends µs,t to control for
nationwide and state specific confounding shocks. Finally we include X ′i,s,t, a vector of county time
- varying socio - economic controls. The clear attempt is to shut down possible endogeneity concerns
due to the omission of county - time varying unobservables, possibly related to the changes in the
number of pawnshops and crime in the county. In the baseline specification we include income per
capita, percentage of people below the poverty line, percentage of unemployment, the number of
social security recipients and the average monthly payment per subsidy. Given the type of credit
service provided by pawnshops, we add the number of commercial banks and saving institutions in
the county. In fact, together with the amount of banking and saving deposits, these controls aim
to capture time varying confounding unobservables, both related to the financial penetration in the
county and the relative presence of crime. Finally, we add the number of sworn police officers and
civilian employees, the population density and the racial/ethnic composition in the county.19 20
19In the baseline specification we include sworn police officers and civilian employees at the state level in the year
(t-1), due to some concern related to the possibility of controlling for a potential outcome. Estimates are essentially
unaffected if we control for total police officers at the county level in year (t)
20The racial origin is defined according to the following four categories: White, Black, Asian and Indian American.
Moreover each race is divided in Hispanic or Not Hispanic ethnic origin.
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Results
Table 2 shows the evolution of β1 both for the aggregated measure of theft crimes (obtained by
summing up larceny, burglary, robbery and motor vehicle theft) and for the other crimes (murder,
aggravated assault, rape, arson). The general decreasing pattern of the coefficient of interest in-
dicates the importance of adding fixed effects and all the described socioeconomic controls. The
results from the two most complete specifications are shown in column 5 and 10, where we include
all fixed effects and all controls.21 For the case of theft crimes, we observe a positive coefficient of
6.24, significant at the 1% level, while no significant effect of pawnshops on other crimes is detected.
Table 2:
In table 3 we perform the same analysis breaking down theft crimes and all other crimes.
Table 3:
Interestingly, we detect a positive and significant effect only on larcenies and burglaries.22 The
coefficient of pawnshops on larcenies is 4.444 and it is significant at the 1% level, while the coefficient
on burglaries is 1.620 and it is again significant at the 1% level. No effect is detected on robberies,
motor - vehicle thefts and on all other crimes.
Table 4 shows the results when we use a log - log specification.
Table 4:
Results do not depend on the functional form used. In fact, a one percent increase in the number
of pawnshops per capita is related to a 1.5 and 0.9 percentage increase in the number for larcenies
and burglaries, respectively. No effect is detected on all other crimes.
Discussion of the Results
21Results are totally unchanged if we include state FE * year FE instead of state linear trends.
22We use a linear specification in our baseline regression, due to the presence of more than 20% of “measured zeros”
for pawnshops and the different amount of zeros across different crimes.
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The above results strengthen the hypothesis that pawnshops might influence theft crime through
their potential demand for stolen goods. In particular we are reassured by two specific points.
First of all, we observe a strong positive effect of the number of pawnshops only on larcenies and
burglaries. Larceny is the most generic (and most frequent) type of theft. It includes shoplifting,
pocket picking, purse snatching, theft of objects from motor vehicles, theft of bicycles and theft
of items from buildings in which the offender has legal access. Burglaries instead, are essentially
larcenies aggravated by the unlawful entry in a private property. These two types of crimes seem
to have in common a certain degree of premeditation that - plausibly - could be encouraged by the
presence of pawnshops in the county.
Moreover, the precision of the underlying mechanism is tested by implicit falsification exercises
that we implement by running regression on crimes that are not supposed to be directly affected by
the presence of pawnshops. Among all of these, the most meaningful falsification test is on motors
and vehicles thefts, because - as we will show in the last section of the paper - vehicles cannot be
sold to pawnshops. We do not detect any effect on this crime as well on robbery, (the most violent
theft crime that will turn up to be significant in the second part of the paper), and on all the other
crimes.
Selection on Unobservables
Nevertheless, given the lack of random assignment, we can not exclude that the omission of
some time variant unobservables might be driving the results on larcenies and burglaries. But, how
big should be this bias in order to completely invalidate our results? The Altonji et al. (2005)
method of assessing selection on unobservables using selection on observables is pursued in this
context. The intuition behind the test is to measure how strong the selection on unobservables
must be relative to the selection on observables in order to explain away the effects. This strategy
relies on a comparison between a regression run with potentially confounding factors controlled for,
and one without.23 The rule of thumb is that any ratio above 1 is acceptable, as it indicates that
selection on unobservables must be larger than selection on observables in order to invalidate the
23Let c denote the estimate with controls, and nc denote the estimate without controls. The Altonji ratio is
| βc
βnc−βc |.
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results (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2012). In our specification, the Altonjii ratio is above 10 for theft
crimes, finally suggesting that there is little concern that selection on unobservables is driving the
results of the analysis.
Reverse Causality
A second major econometric concern is related to the possible bias due to the reverse causality
between pawnshops and larcenies or burglaries. Naively, crime can be the cause - and not the result
- of the rise in the number of pawnshops. Once again, we find hard to believe that this change of
causality might be driving the results, mainly because we detect the effect only on two theft crimes.
If, for example, organized crime was creating pawnshops “ad-hoc” , we would plausibly expect to
observe some positive effect also on other - more violent - crimes.
Nevertheless, the pawnbroker’s choice of locating the business in a particular county might
depend on the contemporaneous level of burglaries and larcenies. In one extreme case, pawnbrokers
might decide to avoid to locate their shop in counties with high level of these two theft crimes. If that
were the case, our β1 coefficient would suffer - if anything - from a downward bias. In the opposite
case, pawnbrokers might decide to locate their shop in counties with an high level of larcenies and
burglaries. This phenomenon, while potentially inflating the effect of pawnshops on crime and hence
undermining the precision of our estimate, it would not make the analysis less interesting. In fact,
what would be the logic of deliberately locating a pawnshop in a high crime community? Honest
pawnbrokers would expect less honest customers, (ceteris paribus, relatively more potential clients
would have been victim of a theft). Moreover, this particular choice might endanger the same
pawnbroker, increasing the likelihood of being a victim of a theft.24 In synthesis, if the coefficient is
inflated by the systematic choice of locating a pawnshop in high-risk communities, we find hard to
believe that this is not due the willingness of consciously allowing for the opportunity of receiving
stolen goods. Table 5 further investigates this aspect focusing on the lagged structure of the number
of pawnshops.
24Another source of concern could be related by the “ad hoc” targeting of pawnshops from burglars. We tend
to disprove this possibility for three reasons. First, there does not seem any evidence related to the possibility
that pawnshops are a constant target from burglars, while a quick google search shows that pawnshops are usually
associated to be a potential market for stolen goods. Second, this shops usually have an high level of security that
should not allow clients to commit an harmless larceny in the shop. Third, 74% of the burglaries hit residence while
only 26 affect stores (FBI, 2010).
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Table 5:
For the case of larceny, the inclusion of pawnshops at t− 1 determines a loss of precision of the
estimate that is re - established in the specification where we include the number of pawnshops up
to t − 2 . For the case of burglaries, we observe a similar pattern that shows how the inclusion of
pawnshops at t − 1 and t − 2 dominates the effect of the contemporaneous number of pawnshops.
These results seem to suggest that the number of pawnshops in the previous years is the main driver
of our results.
To conclude, it is important to notice that the reverse causality issue will be totally addressed
in the last section of the paper where we will rely on the exogeneity of the interaction between the
gold price and the initial concentration of pawnshops in the county, fixed at the first year of the
sample.
Robustness Checks
Table 6 shows the set of robustness checks for larceny (Panel A) and burglary (Panel B).
Table 6:
Column 1 reports the coefficient when we cluster standard errors at the state level, while in
column 2 we show the results with double clustering at county - year level (taking into account
both autocorrelation of the error structure within county over time and the spatial correlation in
each year across counties). In column 3 we show the results by weighting the regression by the
coverage indicator reported by the agency, a measure of the reliability of the information available
to the researcher.25 Finally, we perform two tests to check the sensitivity to outliers. In column 4
25The Coverage Indicator variable represents the proportion of county data that is not imputed for a given year. The
indicator ranges from 100, indicating that all ORIs in the county reported for 12 months in the year, to 0, indicating
that all data in the county are based on estimates, not reported data. The Coverage Indicator is calculated as follows:
CIx = (1− (sum((ORIipop/countypop)((12−monthsreported/12)))) ∗ 100
where
CI = Coverage Indicator
x = county
i = agency within county
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we eliminate from the sample the counties in the top 1% of the pawnshops’ per capita distribution.
In column 5 we drop from the sample of the analysis the counties in the top 1% of the population
distribution. The stability of the coefficient is shown across all different specifications.
Heterogeneity in the Results
In this part of the paper we attempt to detect 1) heterogeneity in the intensity of the effects related
to differences in the environment where pawnshops are located 2) geographical spillover effects that
the presence of pawnshops might have on crime.
Population Density
The anonymity and the dispersion of a big city might amplify the likelihood of the pawnshop
being a convenient destination for stolen goods. In rural and less densely populated areas instead,
the pawnshop might be far from the crime scene. Moreover, in these quiet and remote areas
criminal activity is generally less frequent, and residents are more willing to defend the interests
of the members of their communities. All these considerations could undermine the burglars’
incentives of trying to use the local pawnshop to sell stolen goods (and hence to commit a burglary
in its proximity). For this reason, we investigate for the possible presence of an heterogeneous
effect, dividing the sample in “low” and “high” population density counties. The two categories are
computed with respect to the median density in the sample.
Table 7:
Table 7 shows results in line with the hypothesis that population density can be an important
factor that amplifies the effect of pawnshops on theft crimes. For the case of larceny, the coefficient
is 9.433 and it is significant at the 1% level only in high densely populated counties. For burglaries
the effect is bigger in densely populated counties but it is significant in both sub - samples.
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Geographical Spillovers
The empirical analysis has been focused so far on understanding the effect of the within county
change in the number of pawnshops on the changes of theft crimes in the same county. This section
of the paper extends the analysis focusing on the presence of geographical spillover effects.
We do so by estimating the following OLS regression:
yi,s,t = αi + γt + µs,t +X
′
i,s,tβ0 +#pawni,s,tβ1 +#pawnbordi,s,tβ2 +#pawnstatei,s,tβ3 + i,s,t
where#pawnbordi,s,t is the number pawnshops per capita in i′s bordering counties and#pawnstatei,s,t
is measure of the number of pawnshops per capita in i′s state. To avoid collinearity issues and dif-
ficulty of interpretation, these two variables do not include the number of pawnshops in the county
where crime is actually measured.
Before proceeding to the analysis of the results, two important caveats to the analysis should
be emphasized. First of all, given that our final dataset includes data on 2176 counties (70 % of the
US total) and not all the counties of the United States, we observe these two measures with error.
This inevitably leads to a downward bias in the estimated coefficients. A more serious econometric
concern is instead related to the fixed effect structure of our estimating equation. The inclusion
of two independent variables that belong to a different geographical unit of the dependent variable
potentially worsen the reliability of the estimate of these two coefficients. In fact, we are increasing
the likelihood of omitting some time variant factor related - as an example - both to the variation
of crime in the county and the variation of the number of pawnshops close to its borders.
Table 8 shows the results of this specification.
Table 8:
The inclusion of these two new variables does not change the effect and the significance of the
number of pawnshops in county i on larcenies and burglaries (first row of table 8). Interestingly, no
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effect of pawnshops in the neighboring counties is detected, while but we find a large and significant
coefficient of the number of pawnshops at the state level for larceny (24.55 significant at the 10 %
level) and for burglaries (13.89 significant at the 1% level).
From one side, these results corroborate the findings of different criminologists that - from
interviews with burglars - describe how the presence of a market of stolen goods might strongly
affect the choice of whether and where committing a theft. In fact, burglars know exactly that the
probability of being caught increasess while the stolen property is in possession and - for this reason
- prefer to commit a theft at a maximum distance of half an hour by car from the resale point,
(Sutton, 2010). From the other side, our results seem to capture some strong spillover effect that
shows how burglars might take the risk of traveling far from the crime scene, plausibly to avoid
suspects about the origin of the item or to outdistance the good from the place where it was stolen.
Finally - even if not significant - we find an interesting negative coefficient related to the number of
pawnshops in bordering counties. While not precisely estimated, this result seems to validate the
hypothesis that the location of a potential market for stolen goods might be a key determinant in
burglars decision of where committing a theft.
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4 The Response to Gold Price: Evidence From a Quasi Nat-
ural Experiment
In this section of the paper we further address the endogeneity of pawnshops to crime, exploiting
the exogenous rise in the price of gold as a quasi natural experiment. Before going into the details
of the research design, we will carefully describe the mechanism behind the importance of gold in
our context. Then, we will move to the description of the identification strategy and to analysis of
the final results.
The Importance of Gold Price
The Demand side
Gold has always been the major determinant of pawnbrokers’ profit function.26 Bos et al. (2012)
describe that in the US 34% of men and 63% of women used jewelry as pledge in pawn transactions,
with gold representing roughly 80 percent of the value of all pledges.27 Table 9, borrowed from
Carter and Skiba (2012), reports the number of loans for each collateral category, the percentage of
observations, and the average amount and standard deviation of the items pawned for each category.
The sample of observations is from a pawnshop lender in Texas between 1997 and 2002 .
Table 9:
Forty-nine percent of pawnshops’ loans in the dataset are collateralized with jewelry, with over
half of the items in the jewelry category consisting of rings, including both men’s and women’s
26The importance of gold in pawnbrokers’ activities is reflected in its symbol: three spheres suspended from a
bar. The three sphere symbol is attributed to the Medici family of Florence, Italy, owing to its symbolic meaning of
Lombard. This refers to the Italian province of Lombardy, where pawn shop banking originated under the name of
Lombard banking. The three golden spheres were originally a symbol medieval Lombard merchants hung in front of
their houses, and not the arms of the Medici family. It has been conjectured that the golden spheres were originally
three flat yellow effigies of byzants, or gold coins, laid heraldically upon a sable field, but that they were converted
into spheres to better attract attention.
27Similar evidence is found in Comeau et al. (2011).
21
class and wedding rings. The next most popular category of pledges is televisions and electronics,
including satellite dishes, stereos, and CD players. Individuals also commonly pawn tools, house-
hold items such as small appliances, sporting equipment, guns, musical instruments, and camera
equipment. The average loan amount for loans collateralized by jewels is 96$, a value only lower
than guns and musical instruments. Moreover - as mentioned before - pawnbrokers do not accept
motor - vehicles in their transaction.
But, what makes jewelry and - in particular - gold so profitable in pawnbrokers’ activities? Along
side the fact that gold is one of the most precious metal, a big part of the pawnbrokers’ profits
comes from the process of melting down the gold received by their clients through the “refinement”
process. In fact, 90% of the times pawnbrokers sell their jewelry to a company that is known
as a ‘refiner.’ A refiner will take all of the rings, necklaces, bracelets and other items and melt
them. Truly professional outfits will then begin to remove impurities from the metals until they
get something close to pure gold.28 Hence, stolen items, easily transformed into an unrecognizable
bar of precious metal, can disappear forever from the second - hand market (Sutton, 2010), ending
in the Bullion Market or in similar places.29 This dynamic might hence potentially facilitate the
burglars’ - or the pawnbrokers’ - attempt of safely getting rid of the stolen goods.
The Supply Side
This strong demand for jewelry and gold in particular might influence criminal behavior. In fact, as
in any other type of economic activity, the exact knowledge of the demand for stolen goods affects
the type of items that are actually stolen. Even if most thieves have an ever-changing hierarchy of
items that they prefer to steal (Sutton, 2010), crime statistics and victim surveys describe how the
28Refiners typically have minimum quantities of metals that they will accept and work with. They normally work
with several pounds of the material, so the direct link between clients and refiner can rarely happen. Information
about this argument can be found online from a lot of different sources. As an example: http://www.pawn-
nerd.com/where-do-pawn-shops-sell-their-gold-and-silver/ or http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-
economics/21591230-falling-price-gold-hurting-pawnbroking-business-hock-and-sinker.
29The Bullion Market is a forum through which buyers and sellers trade pure gold and silver. The bullion market
is open 24 hours a day and is primarily an over-the-counter market, with most trading based in London. The bullion
market has a high turnover rate and most transactions are conducted electronically or by phone. Gold and silver
derive their value from their industrial and commercial uses; they can also act as a hedge against inflation.
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most commonly stolen items during burglaries are cash, jewelry and consumer electrical.30 Table
10 shows the percentage of stolen items during burglaries. Police recorded crime data are from the
Sanwdwell Metropolitan Borough Council area of the West Midlands (Burrel and Wellsmith, 2010).
Table 10:
Similarly, table 11 shows the percentage of stolen items during burglaries, by type of item in
1994, 2001 and 2011 in the United States. The category we are interested in is “personal portable
objects” that include clothing, furs, luggage, briefcases, jewelry, watches, keys and other.
Table 11:
In the period of our study, gold price raised of about 37% until 2005 and then experienced an
impressive increase of almost 200% in the last five years of the sample.31
Figure 4.1:
Research Design and Identification Strategy
In this section we describe the research design used to detect the causal effect of pawnshops on
crime. Specifically, we attempt to answer the following question: does the exogenous increase in
the expected resale value of gold cause relatively more theft crimes in counties with an higher initial
concentration of pawnshops? The underlying hypothesis is that the shift in the resale value of gold,
exogenously determined by changes in the macroeconomic conditions, while potentially increasing
burglars’ expected value of committing a theft uniformly in all counties, might cause relatively more
theft crimes in counties with an higher concentration of markets interested in acquiring the stolen
jewelry.
30Similar evidence is found in Fitzgerald and Poynton (2010), Sorensen (2011) and Walters et al. (2013).
31I use as unit of measurement the price of gold in US dollars (averaged over the entire year) per troy ounce. Data
are freely downloadable at the following website: http://www.gold.org.
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More in detail, we estimate the following OLS equation:
yi,t = αi + γt +X
′
i,tβ0 + [#pawnshopsi,t=1997 ∗ goldpricet]β2 + i,t
where i indicates the county, s the state and t the year. Also in this case, the outcome of interest
is the number of reported crimes, by county per year. The coefficient of interest is β2, the effect
on crime of he interaction between the initial concentration of the number of pawnshops per capita
fixed in the first year of our sample (1997) and the gold price at time t. Standard errors are clustered
at the county level.
The key requirement for our exclusion restriction to hold is the lack of correlation between the
error and the interaction term, once we condition on the fixed effect structure of the estimated
model and on all controls. For this reason, as in the first part of the paper, we use a within county
specification including county fixed effect. A key role in this specification is played by the inclusion
of the year FE, that partial out from the estimate the direct and uniform effect that the rise in gold
price might have on the growth of theft crimes in all counties. Moreover, while arguably gold price
is related to the stability of the global economic conditions, our specification uses a wide set of socio
- economic controls related to the conditions of the local economy. Furthermore, in order to control
for the presence of other possible time - varying confounding factors, we add the interaction between
each control fixed in year 1997 and the price of gold.32 Another possible concern could be related
the endogeneity of the initial allocation of the number of pawnshops in the county and the within
county variations of the number of crimes. To minimize this concern we add the interaction between
the number of pawnshops fixed in 1997 and annual linear trends.33 Importantly, this specification
totally addresses the reverse causality concerns between pawnshops and crime expressed in the first
part of the paper.
32 Results are qualitatively unchanged if we allow all the the controls to vary with the gold price.
33Results are almost identical if we include the interaction between pawnshops in year 1997 and quadratic trends.
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Results
Table 12 reports the results, where the first row shows again the effect of the contemporaneous
number of pawnshops, while the second row reports the results of the interaction term of interest.
Table 12:
The coefficients related to the number of pawnshops are essentially identical to the previous
specifications. Moreover, looking at the second row of the table, we find a coefficient of 0.339
significant at the 10% level only on burglaries. To put this result into perspective, a one standard
deviation increase in gold price generates a 0.05 standard deviation increase in the effect of the initial
concentration of pawnshops on burglaries. Or - equivalently - a one standard deviation increase in
the initial concentration of pawnshops in the county increases by 0.04 standard deviation the effect
of the gold price on burglaries. The effect on larceny is not precisely estimated. These might be
due to the fact that jewelry is a rare outcome for this generic type of theft, that includes thefts
of bicycles, motor vehicle parts and accessories, shoplifting, pocket-picking, or the stealing of any
property or article that is not taken by force. The positive effect on robberies is also not precisely
estimated with a p-value of 20%. Furthermore, no effect is detected on all other crimes.
In Table 13 we use a similar specification where we use grouped year fixed effects. We do so in
order to avoid the likely attenuation effect on the variable of interest due to the positive trend of
gold price for almost all the periods of the sample.34 We believe that this change of specification,
while not altering the quality of the identification strategy, can allow for a more flexible estimation
of the variable of interest.
Table 13:
In this case, the coefficient of the interaction term on burglaries is 0.460 and it is significant at
the 5% level. Moreover, the coefficient on robberies is 0.05 and it is significant at the 1% level. In
34In this specification we group year FE, one dummy every three years (two years for the last period) and we
include gold price (given that is not collinear anymore with year FE).
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both cases a one standard deviation in the price of gold increases the effect of the initial allocations
of pawnshops in 1997 of about 0.05 standard deviations. No effect is detected on all other crimes.
Robustness Checks
Table 16 shows the set of robustness checks for burglary (Panel A) and robbery (Panel B).
Table 14:
Column 1 reports the coefficient when we cluster standard errors at the state level, while in
column 2 we show the results with double clustering at county - year level. Both in the case of
burglaries and robberies we loose precision in the estimates, with a p - value ranging from 11 to 14
per cent. As in the first part of the paper, column 3 shows the results when we weight the regression
by the coverage indicator, in column 4 and 5 we eliminate respectively the counties in the top 1%
of the pawnshops and population distribution. Coefficients both in case of burglary and robbery
are stable across all different specifications.
In table 17 we include in the analysis the price of other two precious metals: silver and platinum.
Table 15:
As we did for the price of gold, we interact with these two prices with the initial concentration
of pawnshops in the county. Despite the high correlation between the price of these three precious
metals that vary between 92 and 98 per cent, the interaction term with gold price increases both
its value and its significance, finally outlying the key role of the price of gold in this context.
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5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has investigated the role that market for stolen goods might have in causing crime. In
particular, motivated by the richness of anecdotal evidence, we have looked at this issue trough the
lens of pawnshops, a business that have long being suspected of illicit trade. The endogeneity of
pawnshops to crime has been addressed in multiple ways.
In the first part of the paper we have mainly exploited the panel properties of the data. Results
confirm that the number of pawnshops is a strong and significant predictor of larcenies and bur-
glaries. The findings are robust to extensive robustness checks, the clustering of standard errors at
a different levels, the sensitivity to outliers, averaging the regression by a measure of the quality of
the information available to the researcher and using a log - log model. The mechanism behind the
findings is corroborated by numerous falsification tests on other crimes that disprove the possibility
that pawnshops might affect crime trough channels other than the transaction of stolen goods.
Moreover we have attempted to enter in the black -box of this phenomenon by analyzing possible
geographical spillover effects and the heterogeneity in the results across counties with a different
population density.
In the second part of the paper we have used the rise in the gold price as a quasi natural exper-
iment to finally detect a causal parameter. In particular, the identification strategy relied on the
exogeneity of the interaction between the price of gold, constantly demanded by pawnbrokers in the
form of jewels that are usually melted down to be transformed into a bar of the precious metal, and
the initial allocation of the number of pawnshops in the county. A one standard deviation increase
in the gold price generates a 0.05 standard deviation increase in effect of the initial allocations of
pawnshops on the change of burglaries and robberies. Also in this case, results are robust to a wide
set of robustness checks and are corroborated by the presence of falsification tests on crimes that
should not be affected by the presence of pawnshops.
While uncovering a precise and previously undetected causal mechanism, this paper offers new
direction of future research. A direct spin off of this work would be the analysis of other possible
market for stolen goods, such as flea markets, junkyards and online web sites such as Ebay or
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Craiglist. Moreover, entering in the “black box” of the causal mechanism that links demand and
supply of crime is critical for the understanding of criminal behaviour. Two mechanisms might
in fact play an important role in this context. On the one hand, the increase in the size of stolen
goods’ markets might increase crime by reducing the criminal expected probability of being arrested
(negative deterrence effect). On the other hand, the increase in the level of competition in the resale
market might push up prices, raising the expected resale value of the stolen item (price effect). This
and other interesting aspects are left for future research.
The main and, we believe, most relevant contribution of this paper is a first step towards a
systematic empirical investigation of the causal role of the market for stolen goods, an issue never
properly explored in the existing literature on the determinants of crime.
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Data Appendix
Crimes Definition
1. Murder (criminal homicide): The willful (non negligent) killing of one human being by
another.
2. Forcible rape: The carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will.
3. Robbery: The taking or attempting to take anything of value from the care, custody, or
control of a person or persons by force or threat of force or violence and/or by putting the victim
in fear.
4. Aggravated assault: An unlawful attack by one person upon another for the purpose of in
inflicting severe or aggravated bodily injury. This type of assault usually is accompanied by the use
of a weapon or by means likely to produce death or great bodily harm.
5. Burglary: The unlawful entry of a structure to commit a felony or a theft.
6. Larceny: The unlawful taking, carrying, leading, or riding away of property from the posses-
sion or constructive possession of another. Common types of larcenies include shoplifting, pocket-
picking, purse snatching, theft of objects from motor vehicles, theft of bicycles and theft of items
from buildings in which the offender has legal access.
7. Motor vehicle theft: The theft or attempted theft of a motor vehicle.
8. Arson: any willful or malicious burning or attempting to burn, with or without intent to
defraud, a dwelling house, public building, motor vehicle or aircraft, personal property of another,
etc.
Hierarchy Rule
In some cases, a single incident may have consisted of two distinct offenses. For example, during
the course of a robbery, a victim may have been fatally shot. In cases in which multiple offenses are
committed by the same offender against the same victim during a given felonious act, the hierarchy
rule is employed to determine how the crime is classified. A crime is classified according to the
35
most serious offense committed. Importantly, the hierarchy rule does not apply to the offense of
arson. In fact, when arson is involved in a multiple offense situation, the reporting agency must
report two part I offenses, the arson as well as the additional part I offense.
36
	   1	  
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
      Panel A - Panel Structure 
            
Number of Counties 2176 
    Panel Period  1997 - 2010 
    
      Year Freq. Per cent Cum. 
  
      1997 2,175 7.14 7.14 
  1998 2,175 7.14 14.28 
  1999 2,174 7.14 21.42 
  2000 2,174 7.14 28.55 
  2001 2,174 7.14 35.69 
  2002 2,180 7.16 42.84 
  2003 2,175 7.14 49.98 
  2004 2,176 7.14 57.13 
  2005 2,176 7.14 64.27 
  2006 2,181 7.16 71.43 
  2007 2,176 7.14 78.57 
  2008 2,176 7.14 85.71 
  2009 2,176 7.14 92.86 
  2010 2,176 7.14 100 
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Panel B - Pawnshops and Crime Statistics 
      Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      Pawnshops 30454 5.87 6.32 0 112.85 
      Larcenies 30454 1721.34 1107.40 0 12072.79 
Burglaries 30454 611.89 413.63 0 2959.85 
Robberies 30454 49.33 72.67 0 822.37 
Motor - Vehicle Thefts 30454 178.07 180.07 0 2385.28 
      Murders 30454 3.62 5.33 0 128.87 
Rapes 30454 25.51 22.69 0 513.47 
Aggravated Assaults 30454 221.90 204.82 0 2676.22 
Arsons 30454 16.95 20.59 0 604.24 
Total Enforcement 25073 143.68 116.61 1.72 4141.03 
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Panel C - Socioeconomic and Demographics 
 
       Banks and Savings Institutions 30453 40.34 17.87 0 257.52 
 
       
       % Unemployment 30400 6.04 2.68 0.7 30.1 
 % Of People Below the Poverty Line 30454 0.14 0.06 0 0.50 
 Social Security Recipients 30464 19662.11 45986.32 0 1148135 
 Social Security Monthly Average Payment 30464 408.67 75.82 0 2457 
 Income per Capita 30422 27049.01 7816.2 8419 124742 
 
       Total Population 30464 121856.2 345971.3 2400 9554556 
 Density 30445 304.91 1965.97 0.18 67589.02 
 
       % White non Hispanic 29521 0.8 0.18 0.02 0.99 
 % White Hispanics 29521 0.06 0.11 0 0.97 
 % Black Hispanics 29521 0.002 0.004 0 0.13 
 % Black not Hispanics 29521 0.09 0.14 0 0.86 
 % Asians not Hispanics 29521 0.01 0.02 0 0.63 
 % Asians Hispanics 29521 0.0005 0.001 0 0.05 
 % American Indians Hispanics 29521 0.001 0.003 0 0.05 
 % American Indians not Hispanics 29521 0.01 0.06 0 0.88 
 
       Notes: the number of pawnshops all reported crimes, banks and savings institutions are normalized per 100.000 people. 
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TABLE 2 
Theft Crimes vs. Other Crimes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Theft Crimes Other Crimes 
           
Pawnshops per capita 17.86*** 17.41*** 24.79*** 6.89*** 6.24*** 2.994*** 2.985*** 2.22*** 0.189 0.217 
 (5.32) (5.32) (6.177) (2.191) (2.19) (0.633) (0.634) (0.574) (0.435) (0.437) 
           
Observations 30,454 30,454 30,454 30,454 29,478 30,454 30,454 30,454 30,454 29,478 
Adjusted R-squared 0.005 0.007 0.233 0.841 0.845 0.007 0.007 0.343 0.732 0.743 
YEAR FE NO YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES 
STATE TRENDS NO NO YES YES YES NO NO YES YES YES 
COUNTY FE NO NO NO YES YES NO NO NO YES YES 
Controls NONE NONE NONE NONE ALL NONE NONE NONE NONE ALL 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. The number of pawnshops and reported crimes are expressed 
in per capita terms. The unit of analysis is the county. Theft Crimes include: larcenies, robberies, burglaries and motor – vehicle thefts. Other 
crimes include: murders, rapes, aggravated assaults and arsons. The table shows the evolution of the coefficients when fixed effects and controls 
are included. The most complete specification (with county FE, year FE, State linear trends and all controls) is shown in column 5 and 10.  
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TABLE 3 
Crimes Breakdown 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Larcenies Burglaries Robberies M-V Thefts Murders Rapes    Assaults Arsons 
         
Pawnshops per capita 4.444*** 1.620*** 0.01318 0.1687 0.017 0.0199 0.1282 0.0516 
 (1.66) (0.619) (0.059) (0.187) (0.0174) (0.0453) (0.414) (0.0393) 
         
Observations 29,478 29,478 29,478 29,478 29,478 29,478 29,478 29,478 
Adjusted R-squared 0.830 0.798 0.912 0.840 0.300 0.557 0.731 0.526 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State Trends YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All the standard errors are clustered at the county level. The table shows the results from 8 different regressions, 
one for each type of reported crime. All the specifications include county FE, year FE, state trends and all controls. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   6	  
 
TABLE 4 
 Crimes Breakdown – Log/Log Specification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Larcenies Burglaries Robberies M-V Thefts Murders Rapes    Assaults Arsons 
         
Pawnshops per capita 1.512** 0.923** 0.00663 0.106 0.0172 0.115 0.0223 0.0483 
 (0.711) (0.375) (0.0523) (0.139) (0.0165) (0.284) (0.0414) (0.0366) 
         
Observations 29,478 29,478 29,478 29,478 29,478 29,478 29,478 29,478 
Number of fips 2,106 2,106 2,106 2,106 2,106 2,106 2,106 2,106 
Adjusted R-squared 0.196 0.174 0.087 0.188 0.010 0.072 0.073 0.066 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State Trends YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL 	  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All the standard errors are clustered at the county level. The table shows the results from 8 different regressions, 
one for each type of reported crime. All the specifications include county FE, year FE, state trends and all controls. The independent variable of 
interest is computed as Ln (0.01 + pawnshops_percapita). We compute similarly all the reported crimes. 
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TABLE 5 
Pawnshops’ lagged structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
 Larcenies Burglaries 
       
Pawnshops per capita 4.444*** 1.961 1.816 1.620*** 0.187 -0.0799 
 (1.663) (1.391) (1.330) (0.620) (0.523) (0.520) 
Pawnshops per capita (T-1)  2.38 0.037  1.450** 0.409 
  (1.537) (1.318)  (0.628) (0.565) 
Pawnshops per capita (T-2)   2.696*   1.216** 
   (1.383)   (0.585) 
       
Observations 29,478 27,373 25,272 29,483 27,378 25,272 
Adjusted R-squared 0.830 0.836 0.848 0.798 0.805 0.812 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State Trends YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All the standard errors are clustered at the county level. In both columns 1, both for larcenies and burglaries, we 
show the baseline specification with the contemporaneous number of pawnshops. In columns 2 we add the number of pawnshops per capita, at t-
1. Finally, in columns 3 we include the number of pawnshops per capita at t-2.  
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TABLE 6 
Robustness Checks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
 
Panel A - Larcenies 
      Pawnshops per capita 4.438* 4.438*** 4.441*** 4.624*** 4.397*** 
 
(2.273) (1.697) (1.569) (1.761) (1.668) 
      
 
Panel B - Burglaries 
      Pawnshops per capita 1.620** 1.620** 1.475** 1.647** 1.610*** 
 
(0.687) (0.766) (0.631) (0.648) (0.620) 
     
      Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
State Trends YES YES YES YES YES 
County FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL 
      
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Panel A shows the results for larcenies, while panel B shows the results for burglaries. Column 1 shows the 
results when we cluster at the state level, while in column 2 we cluster at the county/year level.  In column 3 we perform a weighted regression 
using as weight the FBI coverage indicator. In column 4 we eliminate from the sample the counties in the top 1% of the pawnshops’ per capita 
distribution. In column 5 we eliminate from the sample the counties in the top 1% of the population distribution. 
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TABLE 7 
Heterogeneity in the Results: Density 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Larcenies 
       Low                High 
Burglaries 
       Low                High 
Robberies 
      Low                High 
M/V Thefts 
 Low               High 
         
Pawnshops per capita 2.958 9.423*** 1.312* 2.508* -0.0212 0.0786 0.145 -0.0657 
 (1.940) (3.642) (0.704) (1.355) (0.0597) (0.163) (0.198) (0.467) 
         
Observations 14,798 14,680 14,798 14,680 14,798 14,680 14,798 14,680 
Adjusted R-squared 0.779 0.843 0.722 0.850 0.679 0.927 0.657 0.872 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State Trends YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered at the county level.  The sample is divided in counties below the median density and 
above the median density. The density percentiles are computed with respect to the density of the county, averaged for each county in the 14 
years of the sample (1997 - 2010).  	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TABLE 8 
Geographical Spillovers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Larcenies Burglaries Robberies M/V Thefts 
     
Pawnshops (Same County) 4.37*** 1.583*** 0.010 0.157 
 (1.66) (0.619) (0.0588) (0.186) 
 
Pawnshops (Bordering Counties) -2.31 -1.472 -0.107 -0.688 
 (2.95) (1.019) (0.0927) (0.425) 
 
Pawnshops (State Level) 24.55* 13.89*** 0.879 2.60 
 (12.76) (4.652) (0.554) (1.99) 
     
Observations 29,147 29,147 29,147 29,147 
Adjusted R-squared 0.832 0.799 0.912 0.842 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
State Trends YES YES YES YES 
County FE YES YES YES YES 
Controls ALL ALL ALL ALL 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All the standard errors are clustered at the county level. Each column shows the results from a different 
regression where the outcome variable is the number of reported crimes (per capita) in the county. In each regression we include the number of 
pawnshops in the county, the number of pawnshops in the bordering counties (excluding the number of pawnshops in the county where crime is 
measured), the number of pawnshops in the state (excluding the number of pawnshops in the county where crime is measured).  
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Table 9 
Collateral by Category (Carter and Skiba, 2012) 
     Category Number of Observations Percentage of Observations Average Loan Amount Standard Deviation 
     Jewelry 199,288 49.98% $96.28 105.02 
TVs/Electronics 126,297 31.68% $58.80 62.34 
Tools/Equipment 31,600 7.93% $50.18 60.67 
Household Items 10552 2.65% $42.92 44.7 
Missing 7,833 1.96% $63.75 72.54 
Guns 7,734 1.94% $146.97 98.75 
Instruments 7,700 1.93% $116.92 104.66 
Camera/Equipment 4,052 1.02% $75.85 77.87 
Misc 3,666 0.92% $51.50 62.46 
 
Table 9 reports the number of loans for each collateral category, the percentage of observations, and the average amount and standard deviation 
of the items pawned for each category. All amounts are in 2002 dollars. The sample of observations is from a pawnshop lender in Texas between 
1997 and 2002, (Carter and Skiba, 2012).  
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Table 10 (Burrel and Wellsmith, 2010) 
Items stolen during burglaries 
     Cash 40% 
 
Documents 5% 
Jewellery 31% 
 
Ornaments 5% 
Audio 25% 
 
Food 5% 
VCR 17% 
 
Tools 5% 
TV 17% 
 
Furniture 3% 
Personal 12% 
 
Cigarettes 3% 
Telecom 12% 
 
Vehicles 2% 
Computer 11% 
 
Cycle 2% 
Photographic 11% 
 
DVD 2% 
Games 10% 
 
Building 1% 
Purse 10% 
 
Garden 1% 
Cards 10% 
 
Digital 0% 
Luggage 9% 
 
Sports 0% 
Clothing 9% 
 
Antiques 0% 
Domestic  7% 
   Keys 6% 
    
This table show percentage of the stolen items during burglaries. Police recorded crime data are from the Sanwdwell Metropolitan Borough 
Council area of the West Midlands. The period covered is from 1997 to 2003. Percentage do not sum to 100 due to the stealing of multiple 
categories.  
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Table 11 
Items taken during completed household burglaries, by type of item 
       
 
1994 2001 2011
 
Number Per cent Number Per cent Number Per cent 
       Total completed burglaries 5,261,200 
 
3,067,800 
 
2,845,500 
 
       Cash/checks, credit/bank cards, purses/wallets 786,600 15 553,200 18 482,200 16.9 
Motor vehicles 33,400 0.6 33,400 1.1 38,600 1.4 
Motor vehicle parts/accessories, gasoline/oil 217,300 4.1 130,800 4.3 128,500 4.5 
Bicycles or parts, toys, recreation/sport equipment 698,600 13.3 382,700 12.5 246,500 8.7 
Household appliances/portable electronics 1,433,900 27.3 844,400 27.5 978,700 34.4 
Household furnishings/collections 359,000 6.8 225,300 7.3 179,100 6.3 
Personal portable objects 1,482,600 28.2 905,400 29.5 885,200 31.1 
Firearms 161,000 3.1 116,500 3.8 81,900 2.9 
Tools/miscellaneous equipment 776,500 14.8 448,200 14.6 462,100 16.2 
Farm/garden produce, food/liquor 272,900 5.2 169,700 5.5 129,200 4.5 
Animals 21,700 0.4 2,800 0.1 3,500 0.1 
Other 322,300 6.1 173,500 5.7 86,000 3 
Unknown 11,000 0.2 7,400 0.2 7,300 0.3 
 
This table show percentage of the stolen items during burglaries, by type of item in 1994, 2001 and 2011. Personal portable objects include 
clothing, furs, luggage, briefcases, jewelry, watches, keys and other. Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 
1993 – 2011.  
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TABLE 12 
Response to Gold Price 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Larcenies Burglaries Robberies M/V Theft Murder Assault Rape Arson 
         
Pawnshops per capita                             
 
 
4.378*** 
(1.679) 
1.789*** 
(0.665) 
0.026 
(0.063) 
0.172 
(0.209) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.197 
(0.42) 
0.02 
(0.047) 
0.059 
(0.04) 
Pawnshops (t0)*Gold Price (t) 0.481 0.339* 0.0243 0.030 0.00294 -0.103 0.0119 -0.00631 
 (0.560) (0.194) (0.0195) (0.064) (0.00389) (0.121) (0.0151) (0.0120) 
         
Observations 29,465 29,465 29,465 29,465 29,465 29,465 29,465 29,465 
Adjusted R-squared 0.811 0.778 0.910 0.837 0.297 0.720 0.537 0.507 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County FE 
Pawnshops (t0)* Year  
YES 
YES 
YES  
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES  
YES 
YES  
YES 
YES  
YES 
YES  
YES 
YES  
      YES 
 
Controls ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL 
Controls*Gold Price ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All the standard errors are clustered at the county level. This table shows the results of the specification where 
pawnshops per capita and the interaction between pawnshops in 1997 (the first year of the sample) and Gold price at time t are included. We also 
include: 1) the interactions between all controls fixed in the year 1997 and the gold price at time t, 2) the interaction between pawnshops at time 
0 and linear trends. 
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TABLE 15 
Response to Gold Price (Grouped Year Fixed Effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Larcenies Burglaries Robberies M/V Theft Murder Assault Rape Arson 
         
Pawnshops per Capita 4.33*** 
(1.68) 
1.69** 
(0.66) 
0.0008 
(0.63) 
0.17 
(0.21) 
0.09 
(0.017) 
0.18 
(0.42) 
0.021 
(0.047) 
0.059 
(0.041) 
         
Pawnshops (t0)*Gold Price (t) 0.581 0.460** 0.050*** 0.05 0.00427 -0.0786 0.0110 -0.00464 
 (0.532) (0.187) (0.0188) (0.0624) (0.00382) (0.117) (0.0147) (0.0115) 
         
Observations 29,470 29,470 29,470 29,470 29,470 29,470 29,470 29,470 
Adjusted R-squared 0.811 0.778 0.910 0.837 0.297 0.720 0.537 0.507 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County FE 
Pawnshops (t0)* Year  
YES 
YES 
YES  
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES  
YES 
YES  
YES 
YES  
YES 
YES  
YES 
YES  
      YES 
 
Controls ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL 
Controls*Gold Price ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All the standard errors are clustered at the county level. This table shows the results of the specification where 
pawnshops per capita and the interaction between pawnshops in 1997 (the first year of the sample) and Gold price at time t are included. We also 
include: 1) the interactions between all controls fixed in the year 1997 and the gold price at time t, 2) the interaction between pawnshops at time 
0 and linear trends. We used grouped year FE, one dummy every three years (two years for the last period) and we include gold price (given that 
is not collinear anymore with year FE). 
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Table 16 
Robustness Checks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
      
 
Panel A - Burglaries 
            Pawnshops (t0)*Gold Price (t) 0.461* 0.461 0.540*** 0.448** 0.476** 
 
(0.249) (0.298) (0.175) (0.212) (0.187) 
      
 
Panel B - Robberies 
            Pawnshops (t0)*Gold Price (t) 0.0504 0.0504 0.0598*** 0.0526** 0.0567*** 
  (0.0311) (0.0343) (0.0189) (0.0219) (0.0187) 
 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Panel A shows the results for larcenies, panel B shows the results for burglaries, panel C show the results for 
Robberies.  Column 1 shows the results when we cluster at the state level, while in column 2 we cluster at the county/year level.  In column 3 we 
perform a weighted regression using as weight the FBI coverage indicator. In column 4 we eliminate from the sample the counties in the top 1% 
of the pawnshops’ per capita distribution. In column 5 we eliminate from the sample the counties in the top 1% of the population distribution. 
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TABLE 17 
The Response to Gold – Silver and Platinum Prices 
 (1) (2) 
 Burglaries Robberies 
   
Pawnshops (t0)*Gold Price (t) 1.743*** 0.115** 
 (0.463) (0.0467) 
 
Pawnshops (t0)*Platinum Price (t) 0.319* 0.108*** 
 (0.179) (0.0289) 
 
Pawnshops (t0)*Silver Price (t) -0.899*** -0.0775** 
 (0.290) (0.0318) 
   
Observations 29,465 29,465 
Adjusted R-squared 0.777 0.909 
Year FE Grouped YES YES 
County FE YES YES 
Controls ALL ALL 
Controls*Gold Price ALL ALL 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All the standard errors are clustered at the county level. In this specification we include the price of platinum 
and silver both interacted with the number of pawnshops in the first year of the sample. 
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